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We propose an efficient quantum key distribution protocol based on the photon-pair generation
from parametric down-conversion (PDC). It uses the same experimental setup as the conventional
protocol, but a refined data analysis enables detection of photon-number splitting attacks by utilizing
information from a built-in decoy state. Assuming the use of practical detectors, we analyze the
unconditional security of the new scheme and show that it improves the secure key generation rate
by several orders of magnitude at long distances, using a high intensity PDC source.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.-a, 42.65.Lm
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a promising appli-
cation of quantum information, with which two distant
legitimate users (the sender Alice and the receiver Bob)
can share a common random bit string, known as a secret
key, with negligible leak to an eavesdropper Eve. The
first QKD protocol has been proposed by Bennett and
Brassard in 1984, which is called BB84 [1]. The original
BB84 protocol proposes the use of an ideal single-photon
source, and secure key distribution should be possible up
to the distance at which Bob’s photon detection rate and
his dark counting rate are comparable. Since such an
ideal single-photon source is not available today, weak
coherent pulses (WCPs) from attenuated lasers are com-
monly used as a photon source [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. The
WCP has two imperfections, the multi-photon part and
the vacuum part. The multi-photon part is vulnerable
against photon-number splitting (PNS) attacks [8], and
one must reduce the energy of the WCP in order to re-
duce the fraction of the multi-photon part. This leads to
a very low key rate. The existence of the vacuum part
simply leads to a reduction of Bob’s photon detection
rate, resulting in a shorter distance limit. Recent analy-
ses [9, 10] show that the former problem can be avoided
by randomly mixing pulses with different energies (decoy
states) [11]. But about half of the pulses are still in the
vacuum state, and hence the distance limit falls short of
the one with the ideal single-photon source.
Another candidate of photon sources within reach of
current technology is conditional generation of single
photons based on parametric down-conversion (PDC)
[12]. The state of the photons generated in two modes A
and S by PDC can be written as [13]
|Ψ〉AS =
∞∑
n=0
√
pn|n〉A|n〉S, (1)
pn ≡ µ
n(1 + µ)−(n+1) (2)
where |n〉 represents the state of n photons and µ is the
average photon-pair rate. If Alice measures the mode A
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FIG. 1: The experimental setup of QKD system with PDC.
Alice and Bob choose the bases by polarization rotators
(PR’s). Bob detects the photons by two threshold detectors
(DB’s) after a polarizing beam splitter (PBS). The inset shows
the photon number distributions of the triggered events p
(t)
n
and the nontriggered events p
(nt)
n , when µ = 0.3, ηA = 0.5
and dA = 10
−6.
by an ideal photon-number-resolving detector with unit
efficiency and selects the cases where just one photon has
been detected, she would conditionally obtain an ideal
single photon in mode S. But in practice, she must use a
threshold (on/off) detector with nonunit efficiency, which
cannot distinguish one from two or more photons. In
this case, she selects the cases where the detection has
occurred (triggered events). The good news is that the
dark count rate of current detectors is very low, and we
can still neglect the vacuum part of mode S for triggered
events (see Fig. 1). Hence this source achieves the same
distance limit as the ideal source. On the other hand,
the mode S contains multi-photons, which is the same
drawback as the WCP. One must decrease µ and thereby
reduce the rate of triggering to avoid PNS attacks, lead-
ing to a severely low key rate. The remedies for this
problem proposed so far are accompanied by introduc-
tion of additional complexity to the experimental setup,
such as the random amplitude modulation for the use
of decoy states and/or replacing Alice’s detector by de-
tector arrays in space or in time domain to improve the
2photon-number-resolving ability [14, 15].
In this letter, we propose a very simple solution. Noth-
ing is added to the experimental setup of the PDC with
a triggering detector. The crux of our new protocol is
to run the BB84 protocol regardless of whether Alice’s
detector is triggered or not. By comparing the detection
rates for the triggered events and the nontriggered events,
we can detect the presence of PNS attacks. We assume
that threshold detectors are used by Alice and Bob, and
derive a formula for the unconditionally secure key rate.
Borrowing the parameters in a recent experiment, our
calculation shows that the key rate is improved by sev-
eral orders of magnitude compared to the conventional
security analysis.
We first look at the property of Alice’s source com-
posed of PDC with Eq. (1) and a threshold detector DA
with efficiency ηA and dark count rate dA. Let γn be the
probability of detection (triggering) at DA when n pho-
tons are emitted in mode S. Since n photons are emitted
also in mode A, we have
γn = 1− (1− dA)(1− ηA)
n. (3)
Then n-photon emission events (at rate pn) are divided
into the events with triggering (at p
(t)
n ) and the events
without triggering (at p
(nt)
n ), where p
(t)
n = pnγn and
p
(nt)
n = pn(1−γn), whose distributions typically look like
Fig. 1.
Alice changes the polarization of the pulse in mode
S according to the BB84 protocol and sends it to Bob.
Bob measures this signal by a polarization rotator and a
polarizing beam splitter followed by two threshold detec-
tors, as in Fig. 1. We say the signal is ‘detected’ by Bob if
at least one of the detectors clicks. When both detectors
click, Bob assumes his outcome to be a random bit value.
Let Qn be the rate of events where Alice emits n pho-
tons in mode S and Bob detects the signal. These events
are also divided into two groups, the events accompa-
nied by Alice’s triggering (at rate Q
(t)
n ) and the rest (at
Q
(nt)
n ), where Q
(t)
n = Qnγn and Q
(nt)
n = Qn(1 − γn). Be-
hind these relations lies the fact that the state of PDC
in Eq. (1) becomes a direct product once we condition
on the photon number n in mode S. Hence there should
be no correlations between the triggering at DA and any
event occurring in mode S. This fact also ensures that the
quantum bit error rate (QBER) en when Alice emits n
photons in mode S should be the same whether or not the
triggering occurs at DA. Therefore, the overall detection
rate Q(t) and the QBER E(t) with triggering, and the
overall detection rate Q(nt) and the QBER E(nt) without
triggering are expressed by
Q(t) =
∞∑
n=0
Q(t)n , Q
(nt) =
∞∑
n=0
Q(nt)n , (4)
E(t) =
∞∑
n=0
Q
(t)
n en
Q(t)
, E(nt) =
∞∑
n=0
Q
(nt)
n en
Q(nt)
. (5)
These four quantities are observed in the actual protocol,
while there is no way to measure directly the contribu-
tions from each photon number, except for e0, which is
always 1/2.
We discuss the security of our protocol by Gottesman-
Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill formula [16, 17], which is written
as follows for the key rate R(t) with triggering:
R(t) = q{−Q(t)f(E(t))H2(E
(t))
+Q
(t)
0 +Q
(t)
1 [1−H2(e1)]}. (6)
The formula has recently been proved [18] to be valid
even if Bob’s detection is made by threshold detectors
as in Fig. 1, as long as the two detectors have the same
efficiency. Here q(= 1/2) is the protocol efficiency, f(E)
is the error correction efficiency, and H2(E) is the binary
entropy function. Since Q
(t)
0 , Q
(t)
1 , and e1 are not ex-
actly determined in the actual protocol, we must adopt
the worst value of R(t) in the possible range of these pa-
rameters.
In the conventional protocol, we only observe Q(t) and
E(t). In this case, we rely on the obvious inequality
Q
(t)
n ≤ p
(t)
n to obtain an upper bound on the multi-
photon contribution Q
(t)
multi ≡
∑
∞
n=2 Q
(t)
n . This bound
is meaningful only when Q(t) > p
(t)
multi ≡
∑
∞
n=2 p
(t)
n .
Since the scaling to µ and the channel transmission ηc
is Q(t) ∼ O(ηcµ) and p
(t)
multi ∼ O(µ
2), we have to choose
µ ∼ O(ηc) and hence R
(t) ∼ O(η2c ) at best, which means
a rapid decrease of the key rate against the distance [see
Fig. 2 (f) below].
Now we will show that observation of nontriggered
events, Q(nt) and E(nt), leads to a significant improve-
ment of the key rate. The crucial relation is
Q(t)n = rnQ
(nt)
n , (7)
where rn ≡ γn/(1− γn) = p
(t)
n /p
(nt)
n . Eve cannot alter rn
since it is determined by Alice’s parameters ηA and dA.
From Eq. (3), we see
0 ≤ r0 < r1 < r2 < r3 · · · . (8)
By comparing r ≡ Q(t)/Q(nt) with rn’s, we have a clue
about the distribution Q
(t)
n over the photon number. The
mechanism can be explained in two different ways. If
we assume Alice’s measurement by DA occurs earlier,
then it looks as if she randomly switches between two
distributions, {p
(t)
n } and {p
(nt)
n }. This is rather similar
3to the idea of one-decoy-state QKD [9]. Comparing r
and rn = p
(t)
n /p
(nt)
n gives a clue about the PNS attacks,
namely, r should be close to r1 in the normal opera-
tion, but it will approach r2 if Eve exploits the multi-
photon events. If we assume Alice’s measurement occurs
after Bob’s detection, we notice that the photon num-
ber distribution at mode A conditioned on Bob’s detec-
tion is proportional to Qn. Hence Alice physically pos-
sesses the distribution about which she wants to learn,
and she makes a measurement by DA. The averaged
rate Q(t)/(Q(nt) + Q(t)) should then be compared with
γn, which is equivalent to the comparison between r and
rn = γn/(1− γn).
The remaining question is whether such a clue is
enough to improve the key rate significantly. In the decoy
state methods, we can tailor the number and the ampli-
tudes of decoy states at will, but here we have no such
freedom except for the strength µ of PDC. This is an-
swered by conducting a quantitative analysis as follows.
From Eqs. (7) and (8), we have r2Q
(nt)
n ≤ Q
(t)
n for n ≥ 2.
Applying Eq. (4) leads to r2(Q
(nt) − Q
(nt)
0 − Q
(nt)
1 ) ≤
Q(t) −Q
(t)
0 −Q
(t)
1 = rQ
(nt) − r0Q
(nt)
0 − r1Q
(nt)
1 . We thus
obtain the minimum value of Q
(nt)
1 as a function of the
only remaining unknown parameter x ≡ Q
(nt)
0 /Q
(nt):
Q
(nt)
1
Q(nt)
≥
r2 − r − (r2 − r0)x
r2 − r1
≡ ξ(x). (9)
From Eqs. (5) and (7) with e0 = 1/2, an upper bound on
e1 is given by
e1 ≤ [Q
(t)E(t) −Q
(t)
0 e0]/Q
(t)
1
≤
2rE(t) − r0x
2r1ξ(x)
≡ ǫt(x). (10)
In a similar way, we have another bound
e1 ≤
2E(nt) − x
2ξ(x)
≡ ǫnt(x). (11)
Combining the two bounds, we have
e1 ≤ ǫ(x) ≡ min{ǫt(x), ǫnt(x)}. (12)
Consequently, in the limit of large block size with which
the estimation errors are negligible, the key rate from the
triggered events is given by
R(t)/q = −Q(t)f(E(t))H2(E
(t))
+Q(nt)min
x
{r0x+ r1ξ(x)[1 −H2(ǫ(x))]}, (13)
where the minimum is taken over the range 0 ≤ x ≤
min{2E(t)(r/r0), 2E
(nt)}. This minimization should be
numerically calculated in general, and we give examples
later. Before that, we here discuss the scaling of the key
rate R(t) against the channel transmission ηc. Up to the
distance at which the influence of the dark countings of
Bob’s detectors becomes substantial, the error rates E(t)
and E(nt) are almost independent of ηc. The detection
ratesQ(t) and Q(nt) are both proportional to ηc, and their
ratio r is also independent of ηc. Then, the functions
ξ(x), ǫt(x), and ǫnt(x) are independent of ηc, and hence
the key rate in Eq. (13) scales as R(t) ∼ O(ηc). The PDC
strength µ only affects the constant factor here, and its
optimum value is independent of ηc. This is a significant
improvement over the rate of the conventional protocol,
R(t) ∼ O(η2c ).
When the distance is not so large, we may produce
a secret key also from the nontriggered events. In this
case, it is more efficient when the error reconciliation is
separately applied to the triggered events and to the non-
triggered events, but the privacy amplification is applied
together, namely, after the two reconciled keys are con-
catenated. The key rate R(both) in this strategy is given
by
R(both)/q = −Q(t)f(E(t))H2(E
(t))
−Q(nt)f(E(nt))H2(E
(nt)) +Q(nt)min
x
{(1 + r0)x
+(1 + r1)ξ(x)[1 −H2(ǫ(x))]}. (14)
The final key rate is thus given by R =
max{R(both), R(t)}.
Next, we assume a channel model and show numerical
examples of the key rate R as a function of the distance l.
Let ηc = 10
−αl/10 be the channel transmission, ηB be the
quantum efficiency of Bob’s detectors, and η ≡ ηcηB. The
background rate pd of each detector is the combination
of the rates of the dark count and the stray light, which
are assumed to happen independently. For simplicity, we
assume that both detectors have the same background
rate. Q
(t)
n is then given by
Q(t)n /p
(t)
n = 1− (1 − η)
n(1− pd)
2, (15)
and Q(t) is calculated by taking summation. Let ed be
the probability that a photon sent from Alice hits the
erroneous detector, which is independent of the length of
the quantum channel. Then we have, after some calcula-
tion,
2Q(t)n en/p
(t)
n = 1− (1− η)
n(1− pd)
2
−(1− pd)[(1 − ηed)
n − (1 − η + ηed)
n], (16)
and E(t) is calculated by taking summation. Q(nt) and
E(nt) are calculated similarly.
The values of the parameters are chosen as follows.
Alice may use a non-degenerate PDC and obtain vis-
ible and telecom-wavelength photons in mode A and
S, respectively. Therefore, we assume a typical silicon
avalanche photodiode for DA, which has dA = 10
−6 and
(a) ηA = 0.5. We also show the case with (b) ηA = 0.1
to see the dependence on ηA. The remaining parameters
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FIG. 2: Achievable key rates for different implementations
of BB84. The calculations are done in the case of (a) the
efficient PDC protocol with ηA = 0.5 and dA = 10
−6, (b)
the efficient PDC protocol with ηA = 0.1 and dA = 10
−6,
(c) ideal single-photon source, (d) WCP with infinite number
of decoy states, (e) WCP with one decoy state, and (f) the
conventional PDC protocol with ηA = 1 and dA = 0.
are borrowed from the experiment by Gobby et al. [2],
which are α = 0.21 [dB/km], pd = 8.5×10
−7, ηB = 0.045,
ed = 3.3 [%], and f(E
(t)) = f(E(nt)) = 1.22. For each
distance l, we have chosen the optimum value µopt for µ
so that the key rate is highest, and the result is shown in
Fig. 2 as curves (a) and (b). The step at ∼ 130 km, more
pronounced on curve (b), appears since the nontriggered
events cease to contribute to the final key at this dis-
tance. Beyond this distance, the difference in ηA causes
a slightly low key generation rate for (b). We have also
shown [curve (f)] the key rate for the conventional anal-
ysis with dA = 0 and ηA = 1. The remaining parameters
are chosen to be the same. In comparison to this key rate
with O(η2c ) dependence, the key rates in our new proto-
col scale as O(ηc), and the improvement reaches several
orders of magnitude as the distance gets larger. Let us
emphasize again that the two protocols use exactly the
same experimental setup.
For comparison, we included key rates for schemes us-
ing WCP with decoy states [curves (d) and (e)] [9]. At
shorter distances, the difference comes from that of the
optimal mean photon number. For example, µopt of (d)
is 0.48 while that of (a) is 0.19. This may be caused
by the higher multi-photon rate of PDC, whose photon
number distribution pn is thermal. However, the present
scheme has a positive key gain up to almost the same
distances as with an ideal photon source [curve (c)]. The
fact that no additional elements are needed in the PDC
setup to beat PNS attacks makes it a viable candidate for
the practical QKD. Recently Ma et al. [19] have shown
that the achievable distance of WCP is further improved
by two-way classical communication and post-processing.
This interesting scheme also improves that of our scheme.
Finally, it is worth to discuss the feasibility of the
present scheme. As shown in Ref. [20], high photon-pair
generation from PDC (µ = 0.9) using PPLN devices is
possible in current technologies. The repetition rate of
our scheme will be limited by that of DA, but it can be
improved by a high-repetition photon detection scheme
[21]. Unlike WCP schemes, the achievable distances with
the single-photon source and the PDC source depend on
the coupling efficiency between the source and the single-
mode fiber. In the case of PDC from PPLN waveguide,
we can estimate the coupling efficiency of more than 80
% in the current experiment [22], which still leads to a
longer achievable distance than WCP schemes. The PDC
source and the single-photon source also suffer from other
losses in mode S such as ones at the polarization rotator,
so further reduction of the losses is an important subject
in the future experimental studies.
In conclusion, we have proposed an efficient QKD pro-
tocol with PDC, which utilizes the events discarded in
the conventional PDC protocol to derive tighter bounds
on the rate and the QBER of the single-photon part. The
only difference between the present and the conventional
protocol is the classical data processing. We found that
the key rate is significantly improved in the new protocol.
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